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The purpose of the lesson:

To give students a general idea of ​​the course of the Battle of Kursk.

Tasks:

  • Educational: to form knowledge about the completion of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. To acquaint with the main events of the Battle of Kursk, to show the military art of the Soviet command, to reveal the heroism of Soviet soldiers. Explain the concept of "Kursk Bulge". Determine the significance of the Battle of Kursk.
  • Correctional and developmental: continue to develop the ability to establish the sequence of events, to show places of historical events, territory, front line on the map; maintain a conversation on the assessment of a historical event.
  • Educational: foster feelings of patriotism, pride in their people. Why people at all times honor the heroes who defended the Fatherland.

Basic knowledge: July 1943 - Battle of the Kursk Bulge; July 12, 1943 - tank battle near Prokhorovka; liberation of Soviet territories.

Basic concepts: radical change, coalition.

Lesson equipment:

  • map "Great Patriotic War".
  • TSO, video film "Battle of Kursk".
  • Drawings of students about the war.
  • Presentation "Battle of Kursk".
  • Table "The main battles of the war."

Lesson type: learning new material.

During the classes

  1. Introductory remarks by the teacher. Message of the topic, the purpose of the lesson.
  2. Updating knowledge, announcing a new topic.
  3. Learning new material.
  4. Anchoring.
  5. Self-study assignment. Assessment of knowledge.

Intro of the presentation "Battle of Kursk" (Slide 1)

Teacher... We continue to study one of the most difficult periods in the history of our country - the Great Patriotic War. On February 2, 2013, the whole country celebrated the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, which marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the war. (Vocabulary work is a radical break). The purpose of this lesson is to consider the completion of a fundamental change, get acquainted with the main events of the Battle of Kursk, compare it with Stalingrad, and determine the meaning. Today our lesson is attended by a participant in the Battle of Stalingrad and Kursk, Andreev Pavel Alekseevich. During the lesson, you need to fill in the following table:

"The main battles of the war"

The first part of the table is filled in at the beginning of the lesson.

Teacher.(Working with a historical map. Slide 2). After Stalingrad, Hitler decided to take revenge, a "total" mobilization was carried out, German divisions from European countries (50 divisions in total) were transferred to the Eastern Front. (Slide 3), where this offensive is given special importance. The offensive plan must be carried out quickly and with great penetration. In this regard, all preparations should be carried out with the greatest circumspection and energy. (Slide 4) Use the best formations, the best weapons, the best commanders, and a large amount of ammunition on all the main directions. Every commander, every private must be imbued with an understanding of the decisive significance of this offensive.

The Germans used factors:

  1. Suddenness.
  2. Strike to strike on a narrow section of the front, concentrating a huge amount of equipment.
  3. Rapidity.

Teacher. (Slide 5) The Soviet command was aware of the impending operation. It was decided to prepare for defense in strict confidence, while sending the Germans disinformation about the impending strike on another sector of the front. ( Slide 6) Soviet troops under the leadership of marshals N.F. Vatutin and I.S. Horse meat launched an offensive. (Video film "Battle of Kursk").

Teacher. After watching the video about the Battle of Kursk, you must answer the questions by filling out the table. Questions are written on the chalkboard.

  1. What was the goal of the Germans when planning the operation?
  2. What new technology did Germany and the Soviet Union have?
  3. What is the main battle of the Battle of Kursk?

(Conversation on 1-3 questions).

After the conversation, the table is being filled .

(FIZMINUTKA)

(Slide 7) The floor is given to the war veteran Andreev Pavel Alekseevich.

“The soldier lies covered with snow,
He died in a fierce battle.
The thought is tormenting me latently
That I stand before him alive! "

(Slide 9, 10)…. The war only in pictures went off without a hitch. And there was a lot of confusion in life. Miscalculations of the military command and sometimes ridiculous orders to action led to the death of Soviet soldiers. The goal set by the Nazis - to seize the cities: Kursk, Orel, Belgorod - was thwarted by courage, fortitude, fortitude and the highest patriotism of Soviet soldiers. He took part in the Stalingrad Front, then the Bryansk Front and other fronts ... This year's summer was very hot, the heat and lack of water were very exhausting, besides, we often had to change positions: at each new place we had to shovel mountains of earth for cannons. The battle of Prokhorovka was a terrible dream. Everything around was burning and exploding, and in the sky there were the same bombers ... (Slide 11, 12)

War and harsh days of trials
They are still alive in our memory;
There was such a battle here -
Everything burned, earth and metal,
Here the fascist force recognized
Who stood in her way as a wall!
How we survived and won
Each of us knows.
Veteran's medal for grandchildren
I'll leave it as a symbol of war
Laws change - life goes on
In the name of a great country!

(The veteran finished the story with his poems).

(Slide 14). The student's story about the veteran V.O.V. Troitskaya Zoya Alexandrovna (Kozlova)

She was born on August 19, 1925 in Kamyshin in the family of a railway worker. She learned about labor practice early, working voluntarily in the collective farm fields for harvesting and drying grain at the elevator. I met the Great Patriotic War at the beginning of the 10th grade. I did not have to attend training sessions, since in November 1942 German troops approached Stalingrad. The Stalingrad regional party committee through the newspaper appealed to the Komsomol members to provide assistance to the Stalingrad front. In November 1942, a meeting of all reeds took place in the city's central park on the occasion of a voluntary conscription to the front. Then there were four girls for themselves - Valentina Ivanova, Zina Skomorokhova (Bulgakova), Rima Canova (Polovtseva) from grade 10b decided to defend the state. Received military gymnastics and garrison caps. At home, each draftee took a gymnast for herself. On November 17, 1942, 1200 people were loaded onto a barge in the area of ​​the Historical Museum and sent to Stalingrad. In Kapustny Yar, short-term communications courses were held and on December 12, 1942, all the cadets were transferred across the ice to the barricades in Lyudnikov's 138 rifle division. And then the battles for the Krasny Oktyabr plant, the defense of the Embankment. December 31, 1942, Soviet troops launched an offensive in the Stalingrad direction. On February 1, 1943, the Stalingrad people celebrated Victory Day. The reward found her a little later. Zoya Aleksandrovna was awarded a medal for "Defense of Stalingrad". Further the military route lay on Kursk. Here Hitler decided to take revenge for the lost war at Stalingrad and threw fresh forces and new military equipment at Kursk, Oryol and Belgorod. It was scary to retreat at Stalingrad at the beginning of the war, and only then, when the Germans were driven away, he was seized by passion and a desire to quickly expel the enemy from his native land. Fierce battles took place at the Kursk Bulge. The losses were tangible in manpower, not to mention military equipment. Died friend Masha Syrovatko (communications operator - telephone operator). For the Battle of the Kursk Bulge she received a medal "For Military Merit". And in front of the road lay on the Dnieper and Czechoslovakia. There the soldiers were surrounded. The head of the regiment could not risk young girls and asked them to return home. Yes, the war is not a woman's face. In 1946, the girls returned to grade 10. Zoya Aleksandrovna graduated from school and entered the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute. She has always been cheerful by nature and still remains positive. She took part in all institute events and was the first ringleader in holiday competitions. After graduation, she came to work in Kamyshin and Zoya Aleksandrovna went to work at a crane plant, where she worked until her retirement. Has three daughters: Irina (lives in Moscow), Svetlana (lives near Moscow) and Galina lives in Kamyshin. The husband died in 2009. Has 4 adult grandchildren. They all have higher education. Awards: Medals "For Bravery", "For Military Merit", "Defense of Stalingrad", "For the Liberation of Berlin". Order of the "Great Patriotic War" II degree.

Teacher... After the victory, the Soviet army went on the offensive. On August 5, Belgorod and Orel were liberated. ( Slide 14) In Moscow, the first victory salute in the history of the Second World War was fired. In a short time they liberated Kharkov, Donbass, Bryansk, Smolensk.

The significance of the Battle of Kursk.

  1. The Battle of Kursk ended a radical turning point in the course of World War II in favor of the USSR. The Soviet command secured the strategic initiative in the war.
  2. The victorious outcome of the Battle of Kursk accelerated the collapse of the Hitlerite bloc. Italy was about to withdraw from the war, the authority of the fascist leadership in Romania and Hungary was shaken, the isolation of Germany intensified, the dictator of Spain Franco withdrew his "Blue Division" from the Soviet-German front.
  3. As a result of the defeat of the fascist troops near Kursk, the resistance movement intensified in European countries.

Teacher. Prokhorovskoe field is called the third field of Russian glory: here a mortal blow was dealt to the German fascist invaders. Prokhorovka field occupies a special place in our history ... (Slide 15-16)

(Slide 17) Based on the decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated April 26, 1995 No. In the regional center of Prokhorovka, the State Military-Historical Museum-Reserve "Prokhorovskoye Pole" was created.

Anchoring... (Test).

    The largest tank battle took place under:
    A) Prokhorovka
    B) Kursk
    C) Stalingrad

    Remove the excess. The leadership of the Battle of Kursk was carried out by:
    A) Zhukov
    B) Konev
    C) Vatutin

    Read the text and indicate which military event in question.
    “I happened to witness this truly titanic duel between two steel armadas (up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled artillery units) on July 12, 1943”.
    A) Battle of the Kursk Bulge
    B) Battle of Moscow
    C) Battle of Stalingrad

    Remove the excess. All with the exception of one belong to the military equipment of the Germans:
    A) "Tiger"
    B) "Ferdinand"
    C) "Panther"
    D) "Katyusha

    The battle of Kursk took place under the code name:
    A) "Typhoon"
    B) "Uranus"
    C) "Citadel"

(Slide 18) Summing up the lesson. Congratulations to the veteran and presentation of gifts from children.

Homework: pick up stories about the heroes of the Battle of Kursk.

The Great Patriotic War. And the Soviet soldier, who was leaving for immortality, Was stronger than fire and more reliable than metal!

The Battle of Kursk (July 5 - August 23, 1943) is one of the key battles of World War II and the Great Patriotic War in terms of its scale, forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences. The largest tank battle in history; it was attended by about two million people, six thousand tanks, four thousand aircraft.

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west - the "Kursk Bulge".

The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky. Army General K.K. Rokosovsky commander of the Central Front, Army General N.F. Vatutin, Commander of the Voronezh Front, Colonel-General of the Army I.S. Konev Commander of the troops of the Steppe Front

Germany-Operation Citadel Field Marshal E. Manstein, Army Group South Field Marshal Günter Hans von Kluge, Army Group Center Field Marshal Walter Model, Commander of the 2nd Panzer, 2nd and 9th armies (Army Group Center) General Hermann Goth, Commander of 4th Panzer Army, 24th Panzer Corps and Task Force Kempf (Army Group South)

The forces of the sides by the beginning of the operation 1,300,000 people + 600,000 in reserve, 3,444 tanks + 1,500 in reserve, 19,100 guns and mortars + 7,400 in reserve, 2,172 aircraft + 500 in reserve According to Soviet data - approx. 900,000 people According to German data - 780,000 people, 2,758 tanks and self-propelled guns about 10,000 guns, about 2,050 aircraft

Battle of Prokhorovka Up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle. During the day of the battle, both sides lost from 30 to 60% of tanks and self-propelled guns each. On July 12, a turning point came in the Battle of Kursk, the enemy stopped the offensive, and on July 18, he began to withdraw all his forces to their original position. "Citadel" failed, the enemy failed to turn the tide of the war in their favor. On this day, the Kursk defensive operation of the Soviet troops ended.

The Turning Point Going on the offensive, the Red Army liberated the cities of Orel and Belgorod on August 5 in the course of fierce battles.

August 5, 1943 On August 5, Soviet troops recaptured the cities of Orel and Belgorod from the enemy. On this day, in the sky over the capital, for the first time in the entire war, Muscovites saw volleys of festive fireworks. From now on, it will celebrate major victories at the fronts. On August 23, Kharkov was liberated.

Losses The victory in the Battle of Kursk cost the Soviet troops dearly, but the enemy suffered huge losses. Irreparable damage was done to the prestige of German weapons. Thirty German divisions, including 7 tank divisions, were defeated.

Heroes of the Battle of Kursk

Gorovets Alexander Konstantinovich Guards lieutenant, deputy squadron commander of 88 guards. Shot down 8 enemy aircraft. When the ammunition was used up, he struck a propeller blow on the tail unit of the ninth bomber. Returning on a damaged plane to his airfield, Gorovets came under an unexpected blow from four enemy fighters. He began to maneuver, dodge enemy bursts, but the forces were too unequal. His plane was hit and plummeted towards the ground. Gorovets opened the lantern and pulled the parachute ring, but he could not escape. The plane fell into a crater from a large aerial bomb and was covered with earth.

Butenko Ivan Efimovich Guard lieutenant, tank commander In the area of ​​the village of Smorodino, the tank unexpectedly collided with eight German tanks, which were in ambush. Butenko decided to take the fight. A direct hit of a shell knocked out the T-34 cannon. Butenko decided to go to the ram. With a strong blow of the frontal armor, he rammed one, and then another German tank. The rest of the enemy vehicles opened fire from all the cannons. Butenko's tank was on fire. The driver was killed and the radio operator was badly wounded. Jumping out of the burning tank, Guard Lieutenant I.E. Butenko, from a pistol snatched from a German officer, shot him and several other soldiers from rammed tanks, took the documents from the killed officer and, under heavy artillery and mortar fire, carried the seriously wounded radio operator from the battlefield. In August 1943, he took part in the Smolensk offensive operation. He distinguished himself in battles near Yelnya and Smolensk. Killed in action on October 21, 1943.

Borisov Mikhail Fyodorovich Guard senior sergeant, Komsomol organizer of the artillery battalion of the 58th MSB. On July 11, 1943, near the village of Prokhorovka (Belgorod Region), one of the battalion's batteries was attacked by 19 enemy tanks. When the gun crew went out of action, MF Borisov himself stood up to the gun and knocked out 7 tanks with direct fire. In this battle he was wounded. The forty-third bitterness of wormwood I smelled from afar - A black, charred plain. I see the Kursk Bulge ... M.F. Borisov.

Zinchenko Ivan Trofimovich Senior sergeant, commander of a machine-gun platoon 447 MSB. On July 7, 1943, near the Syrtsovo farm (Yakovlevsky district of the Belgorod region), repulsing the attack of enemy tanks and infantry, senior sergeant I.T. Zinchenko knocked out a tank with an anti-tank grenade. At a critical moment in the battle, tying up anti-tank grenades and picking up a grenade, he rushed towards a heavy tank and blew it up with him.

Belgin Andrey Antonovich Commander of the battalion of the 214th Guards Rifle Regiment. On July 6, 1943, the battalion, repelling 11 enemy attacks, held its positions. For 16 hours of fighting, the soldiers of the battalion knocked out 14 Nazi tanks and destroyed up to 600 German soldiers and officers. Captain Belgin died heroically in this battle. The surviving 15 soldiers from 450 soldiers and commanders of the 3rd battalion retreated to new positions in an organized manner.
































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Presentation on the topic: Battle of the Kursk Bulge

Slide No. 1

Slide No. 2

Slide Description:

The Battle of Kursk (the Battle of the Kursk Bulge), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.

Slide No. 3

Slide Description:

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge").

Slide No. 4

Slide No. 5

Slide Description:

Having information about the preparation of the German-fascist troops for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go over to the defensive on the Kursk Bulge and, during a defensive battle, bleed the enemy's shock groups and thereby create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive. ...

Slide No. 6

Slide Description:

To carry out Operation Citadel, the German command concentrated 50 divisions in the sector, including 18 tank and motorized divisions. The enemy grouping numbered, according to Soviet sources, about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft.

Slide No. 7

Slide Description:

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the headquarters of the Supreme Command created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts), which had more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (commanded by General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern face of the Kursk salient, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commanded by General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) defended the southern face.

Slide No. 8

Slide Description:

Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - southern front. The troops that occupied the ledge relied on the Steppe Front as part of a rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry corps (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

Slide No. 9

Slide No. 10

Slide Description:

From the direction of Orel, a grouping under the command of Field Marshal Gunter Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) was advancing, from the side of Belgorod - a grouping under the command of General Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Task Force Kempf of Army Group South).

Slide No. 11

Slide Description:

Slide No. 12

Slide Description:

On July 12, in the vicinity of the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place - a battle between the advancing enemy tank group (Operational Group Kempf) and the Soviet forces counterstriking. Up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle on both sides.

Slide No. 13

Slide Description:

Slide No. 14

Slide Description:

On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and Left Wing of the Western Fronts launched Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of crushing the enemy's Oryol grouping. On July 13, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy's defenses on the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol axes and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 km.

Slide No. 15

Slide Description:

In the following days, having introduced the reserve into the battle, the German-fascist command tried at any cost to fulfill the order of the Fuehrer and break through to Kursk. But the Soviet troops stood firm, heroically defending every inch of their native land. Having met the staunch resistance of the 6th Panzer (Major General A.L. Getman) and the 3rd Mechanized (Major General S.M. Krivoshein) corps of the 1st Tank Army, the 48th German Tank Corps of General O. von Knobelsdorff in the afternoon of July 6 turned northeast in the direction of Luchka, where he defended the 5th Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant General A.G. Kravchenko) with the 156th Rifle Regiment.

Slide No. 16

Slide Description:

The battle of Kursk, unparalleled in its fierceness and intensity of the struggle, ended with the victory of the Red Army. The armored armadas of the enemy crashed against the inaccessibility of the Soviet defense. The ambitious hopes of the German fascist command to seize the strategic initiative and change the course of the war in their favor collapsed. Hitler's strategists had to abandon offensive plans and hastily make a decision to go over to strategic defense. So the harsh reality refuted the enemy's deeply erroneous ideas about the invincibility of the German army in the summer and forced him to take a more sober look at the real state of affairs.

Slide No. 17

Slide Description:

The Soviet command, possessing a strategic initiative, dictated its will to the enemy. The disruption of the German fascist offensive near Kursk created a favorable environment for delivering a crushing retaliatory strike. This was facilitated by the fact that, simultaneously with the measures to create a solid defense on the Kursk salient, Soviet troops were preparing for a counteroffensive in order to defeat the enemy strike groups in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions.

Slide No. 18

Slide Description:

The troops of the Western Front (Colonel General V.D.Sokolovsky) delivered the main blow with their left wing. They had to first, in cooperation with the troops of the Bryansk front, encircle and destroy the enemy's Bolkhov grouping, which was covering from the north the main forces of the German fascist forces on the Oryol bridgehead. Then, advancing in a southern direction on Khotynets, they had to cut off the path to the west of the Oryol group of the enemy and, together with the troops of the Bryansk and Central fronts, defeat it.

Slide No. 19

Slide Description:

The Bryansk Front (Colonel General M.M. Popov) delivered the main blow with its left wing in the general direction of Oryol, and part of its forces attacked Bolkhov. The troops of the Central Front received the task of striking with their right wing in the general direction of Kromy. Then, building on their success in the northwestern direction, they had to cover the enemy's Oryol grouping from the southwest and complete its defeat in cooperation with the Bryansk and Western fronts.

Slide No. 20

Slide Description:

Thus, the idea of ​​Operation Kutuzov was to cut through the enemy grouping and destroy it piece by piece by counter strikes from three fronts from the north, east and south in the general direction of Orel. The concentration of troops, military equipment and all other preparatory measures were carried out by the fronts in advance. Particular attention was paid to the massing of forces and assets in the directions of the main strikes.

Slide No. 21

Slide Description:

The need for this was due to the fact that, attaching great importance to the Oryol bridgehead, the Nazi command, long before its attack on Kursk, had created here a solid defense in depth with a widely developed system of field fortifications. Most of the settlements were prepared for a perimeter defense. A serious obstacle for the advancing Soviet troops was the large number of rivers, ravines and gullies. This made it difficult to use large tank forces and, consequently, complicate the task of developing tactical success into operational one. Of great importance for the development of events was the fact that on the bridgehead the enemy had such a large junction of highways and railways like Oryol, which provided him with the possibility of a wide operational maneuver in all directions. Thus, the Soviet troops on the Oryol bridgehead were opposed not only by a powerful enemy grouping, but also by a qualitatively new - positional - his defense, which they faced for the first time in the war.

Slide No. 22

Slide Description:

Under these conditions, commanders and staffs had to solve in many ways the issues of echeloning troops, using tanks, artillery and aviation in a new way. The main attention was focused on the deep formation of combat formations of formations and the creation of high operational densities. So, the 11th Guards Army, operating in the direction of the main attack of the Western Front, was supposed to advance in a strip of 36 km. At the same time, its main forces and assets were concentrated on a breakthrough section 14 km wide. And on the rest of the front, only one rifle division was defending.

Slide No. 23

Slide Description:

the distribution of forces and their operational-tactical structure, as the army command reasonably believed, ensured a rapid build-up of efforts in breaking through the enemy's tactical defense zone and the development of success in its operational depth, up to reaching the Bolkhov area (depth 65 km). During the preparation of the operation, reconnaissance, organization of interaction, measures for operational camouflage and engineering support were carried out with great skill. The rear provided the troops with everything necessary for a major offensive operation.

Slide No. 24

Slide Description:

The breakthrough of a strong defense on the Oryol bridgehead and the defeat of a powerful enemy grouping demanded from the advancing troops the utmost exertion of forces and high military skill. The political agencies and party organizations also faced new tasks. Having ensured the creation of insurmountable strength of troops in defense, they now focused all their attention on creating a high offensive impulse among the personnel, mobilizing soldiers to quickly break into enemy defenses and completely defeat the enemy.

Slide No. 25

Slide Description:

In contrast to the counteroffensive in the Oryol direction, the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation was planned and prepared in the course of a defensive battle. The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, having reached the front edge of the German defense on 23 July, were not ready for a major offensive operation.

Slide No. 26

Slide Description:

Slide No. 27

Slide Description:

By August 10, the enemy's defense in the Kharkov direction was finally cut into two parts. An almost 60-kilometer gap was formed between the 4th Panzer Army and the German operational group "Kempf". Thus, conditions were created for the liberation of Kharkov and the development of an offensive in the Left-Bank Ukraine. In accordance with the plan approved by the Supreme Command Headquarters to capture Kharkov, it was supposed to deliver a concentric strike from several directions, while simultaneously deeply covering it from the west.

Slide No. 28

Slide Description:

On August 22, ground and air reconnaissance discovered the beginning of the withdrawal of enemy troops from Kharkov. “In order not to give the enemy the opportunity to escape from the blows,” Marshal of the Soviet Union IS Konev later wrote, “on the evening of August 22, I gave the order for a night assault on Kharkov. All night on 23 August, street battles were going on in the city, fires were blazing, and strong explosions were heard. The soldiers of the 531, 69, 7th Guards, 57th2 armies and the 5th Guards Tank Army, showing courage and courage, skillfully bypassed the enemy's strongholds, infiltrating into his defenses, and attacked his garrisons from the rear. Step by step, Soviet soldiers cleared Kharkov from the fascist invaders. " By dawn on August 23, the roar of the battle for the city began to gradually subside, and by noon Kharkov was completely cleared of the enemy. With the liberation of Kharkov and the Kharkov industrial region, the operation "Commander Rumyantsev" was completed, and in place with it, the Battle of Kursk.

Slide No. 29

Slide Description:

The scale, intensity of the struggle and the results achieved place the Battle of Kursk among the largest battles not only of the Great Patriotic War, but of the entire Second World War. For 50 days, in a relatively small territory, 2 most powerful groupings of the armed forces of the opposing sides waged a fierce struggle. More than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled (assault) guns, up to 12 thousand aircraft took part in battles unparalleled in tension, fierce and stubbornness on both sides. On the part of the German fascist Wehrmacht, over 100 divisions were involved in the Battle of Kursk, which accounted for more than 43% of the divisions on the Eastern Front. On the part of the Red Army, about 30% of its divisions were involved in the battle.

Slide Description:




























1 of 27

Presentation on the topic: Battle of Kursk

Slide No. 1

Slide No. 2

Slide Description:

Battle of Kursk, USSR sides Germany Commanders Konstantin Rokossovsky, Georgy Zhukov, Erich von Manstein, Gunther Hans von Kluge, Nikolai Vatutin Walter Model of the forces of the parties by the beginning of the operation 1.3 million people According to Soviet data - about 900 thousand + 0.6 million in reserve people, according to German - about 780 thousand 3444 tanks + 1.5 thousand in reserve, people, 2758 tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 218 in 19 100 guns and mortars were repaired), about 10 thousand guns and 2050 + 7.4 thousand aircraft in reserve 2,172 aircraft + 0.5 thousand in reserve

Slide No. 3

Slide Description:

Losses of the USSR Defensive phase: Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all) Irretrievable - 70 330 Sanitary - 107 517 Operation "Kutuzov": Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front Irretrievable - 112 529 Sanitary - 317 361 Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front Irretrievable - 71 611 Sanitary - 183 955 General in the Battle of the Kursk Bulge: Irretrievable - 189 652 Sanitary - 406 743 In the Battle of Kursk in total ~ 254 470 killed, prisoners, missing, wounded 608 833 wounded

Slide No. 4

Slide Description:

German losses According to German sources, 103,600 killed and missing on the entire Eastern Front. 433,933 wounded. According to Soviet sources, 500 thousand total losses on the Kursk salient. 1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet, less than 1696 aircraft

Slide No. 5

Slide Description:

Preparation for battle During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"), formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. Throughout April - June, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the sides were preparing for the summer campaign.

Slide No. 6

Slide Description:

Plans and forces of the parties The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk ledge in the summer of 1943. It was planned to deliver converging strikes from the regions of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The shock groups were to unite in the Kursk region, encircling the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name "Citadel". At a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of Gott: the 2nd SS Panzer Corps turns from the Oboyansk direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow a global battle with the armored reserves of the Soviet troops. And, based on the losses, continue the offensive or go on the defensive. (From the interrogation of the chief of staff of the 4th Panzer Army, General Fangor)

Slide No. 7

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The plans and forces of the parties For the operation, the Germans concentrated a grouping of up to 50 divisions (of which 18 tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 assault gun battalions, with a total strength, according to Soviet sources, of about 900 thousand people. The troops were led by Field Marshal Gunter Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal General Fritz Erich von Manstein (Army Group South). Organizationally, the strike forces were part of the 2nd Panzer, 2nd and 9th Armies (commanded by Field Marshal Walter Model, Army Group Center, Oryol region) and 4th Panzer Army, 24th Panzer Corps and operational group "Kempf" (commander - General Herman Goth, Army Group "South", Belgorod region). Air support for the German forces was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets. Several elite SS tank divisions were deployed to the Kursk region to carry out the operation:

Slide No. 8

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Slide No. 9

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The Role of Intelligence Since the beginning of 1943, Operation Citadel has been increasingly mentioned in the interceptions of secret communications from the High Command of the Hitlerite Army and secret directives of Hitler. According to the memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, on March 27, Stalin informed him in general details about the German plans. On April 12, 1943, the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan of Operation Citadel” of the German high command, endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht, but not yet signed by Hitler, who would sign it only three days later, lay on Stalin's desk, translated from German. a scout working under the name "Werther". The real name of this person still remains unknown, but it is assumed that he was an employee of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, and the information he received came to Moscow through the agent “Lucie” operating in Switzerland - Rudolf Rössler.

Slide No. 10

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Kursk defensive operation The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the time of the start of the operation - 3 a.m. (the German army fought in Berlin time - translated into Moscow time as 5 a.m.), at 22:30 and at 2:20 Moscow time, the forces of two fronts carried out counterpreparation of the amount of ammunition 0.25 ammunition. The German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor casualties. An unsuccessful air raid was also made by the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the Kharkov and Belgorod air hubs of the enemy.

Slide No. 11

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Kursk defensive operation Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 o'clock in the morning our time, the Germans also launched a bomb and artillery strike on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went over to the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern face was delivered in the direction of Olkhovatka. Unable to achieve success, the Germans suffered a blow in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they could not break through the Soviet defenses. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which, from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of the tanks, the 9th German army went on the defensive. On the southern face, the main attacks of the Germans were directed to the areas of Korochi and Oboyan.

Slide No. 12

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July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky. Operation "Citadel" - the general offensive of the German army on the Eastern Front in 1943 - was aimed at encircling the troops of the Central (K. K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (N. F. Vatutin) fronts in the region of the city of Kursk by counter-strikes from the north and south under the foundation of the Kursk salient, as well as the defeat of Soviet operational and strategic reserves east of the main direction of the main attack (including in the area of ​​Prokhorovka station). The main blow from the southern direction was inflicted by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (commander - Hermann Goth, 48 tank destroyers and 2 TD SS) with the support of the Kempf army group (V. Kempf).

Slide No. 13

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July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky. At the initial stage of the offensive, the 48th Panzer Corps (commander: O. von Knobelsdorf, Chief of Staff: F. von Mellenthin, 527 tanks, 147 self-propelled guns), which was the strongest formation of the 4th Panzer Army, consisting of 3 and 11 Panzer divisions , mechanized (tank-grenadier) division "Great Germany", 10 tank brigade and 911 dep. battalion of assault guns, with the support of 332 and 167 infantry divisions, had the task of breaking through the first, second and third lines of defense of the Voronezh front from the Hertsovka - Butovo area in the direction of Cherkasskoe - Yakovlevo - Oboya July 5, 1943 Day one. The defense of Cherkassky .. At the same time, it was assumed that in the Yakovlevo area, 48 military corps would connect with units of the 2nd SS division (thereby surrounding the units of the 52nd SS and 67th SD), change units of the 2nd SS division, after which parts of the SS division were supposed to be used against the operational reserves of the Red Army in the area of ​​art. Prokhorovka, and 48 mk was supposed to continue operations on the main direction Oboyan - Kursk.

Slide No. 14

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July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky. To accomplish the assigned task, units of the 48th mk on the first day of the offensive (day "X") needed to break into the defense of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. direction of the village Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of 48 mk determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, parts of the 48th shopping mall. had to reach the city of Oboyan. However, as a result of the actions of the Soviet units and formations, their courage and resilience shown by them, as well as the preparation of the defensive lines that they carried out in advance, the plans of the Wehrmacht in this direction were “significantly adjusted” - 48 mk did not reach Oboyan at all.

Slide No. 15

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July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky. The factors that determined the unacceptably slow pace of advancement of the 48th Panzer Division on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the terrain by Soviet units (from anti-tank ditches along almost the entire length of the defense and ending with radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of ground attack aircraft on the accumulated in front of engineering barriers to enemy tanks, a competent location of anti-tank strongholds (No. 6 south of Korovin in the zone of the 71st Guards Division, No. 7 south-west of Cherkassk and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassk in the zone of the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid rebuilding of the battle formations of battalions 196 Guards rifle regiment (Colonel V.I.Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy's main attack south of Cherkassky, a timely maneuver by divisional and army anti-tank reserves, relatively successful counterattacks into the flank of the wedged-in units of 3 TD and 11 TD with the involvement of 245 troops (Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 tanks M3) and 1440 glanders (lieutenant regiments nickname Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), as well as the incompletely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the outpost in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 baht. 199 Guards rifle regiment, captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of ​​workers' barracks south-west of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of the 48th tank (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of 11th TD and 332nd Infantry Divisions by the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day of "X-1", but the resistance of the outpost was never completely suppressed by dawn on July 5). All of the above factors influenced both the speed of concentration of units in their initial positions before the main attack, and their advance during the offensive itself.

Slide No. 16

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July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky. Also, the speed of the corps offensive was affected by the shortcomings of the German command in planning the operation and the poorly worked out interaction of tank and infantry units. In particular, the "Great Germany" division (W. Heyerlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and the 10 tank destroyers attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 Pz.V command tanks) in the current conditions combat proved to be clumsy and unbalanced connections. As a result, for the entire first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks was crowded in narrow "corridors" in front of the engineering barriers (it was especially difficult to overcome the swampy anti-tank ditch west of Cherkassky), came under a combined attack by Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery - from PTOP no. 6 and No. 7, 138 guards artillery point (Lieutenant Colonel M.I.Kirdyanov) and two regiments of the 33rd brigade (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially in the officer corps), and could not deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the turn Korovino - Cherkasskoye for a further strike in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkasskoye. At the same time, the infantry units that had overcome the anti-tank obstacles in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd battalion of the Fusilier regiment, which was at the forefront of the attack of the "VG" division, at the time of the first attack found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the "VG" division for a long time actually could not bring them into battle. The result of the resulting congestion on the advance routes was also the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th Panzer Corps in firing positions, which affected the results of artillery preparation before the start of the attack.

Slide No. 17

Slide Description:

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky. The development of the offensive of the 48th Panzer Division in the afternoon of July 5 was most facilitated by: 1. active operations of combat engineer units, 2. support for aviation (more than 830 sorties) 3. overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles.

Slide No. 18

Slide Description:

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky. An important factor in the success of German tank units was the qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that took place by the summer of 1943. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of the anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units manifested itself in the fight against both the new German Pz.V and Pz.VI tanks, and with modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet Iptap were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances half to three times less than the effective range of fire of the latter, heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent, not only in the combined arms 6 Guards A, but also in the second line of defense of the 1st tank army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).

Slide No. 19

Slide Description:

July 5, 1943 The first day. Defense of Cherkassky. Only after the bulk of the tanks overcame the anti-tank obstacles south of Cherkassy in the afternoon, repelling a number of counterattacks by Soviet units, divisions of the VG and 11th division were able to catch hold of the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting turned into a street phase. At about 21:00, Divisional Commander A.I. Baksov ordered the withdrawal of units of the 196th Guards Special Forces to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassk, as well as to the center of the village. During the withdrawal, units of the 196 Guards Special Forces set up minefields. At about 21:20 a combat group of grenadiers of the "VG" division, supported by the "Panthers" of the 10th brigade, broke into the Yarki farm (north of Cherkassky). A little later, 3 TD of the Wehrmacht managed to capture the Krasny Pochinok farm (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th Panzer Wehrmacht was the penetration of the 6th Guards into the first line of defense. And at 6 km, which in fact can be considered a failure, especially against the background of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating eastward in parallel with 48 mk), less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.

Slide No. 20

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July 6, 1943 Day two. The first counterattacks. By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 4th TA wedged into the defense of the 6th Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the 48th tank offensive zone (in the area of ​​the Cherkasskoye village) and 12-13 km in the 2nd tank SS (in the Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenfuehrer P. Hausser) managed to break through the first defensive line of the Soviet troops to the full depth, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards Special Division (Colonel I. M. Nekrasov), and approached the 5-6 km front directly to the second line defense occupied by the Guards Special Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), engaging in battle with its forward units.

Slide No. 21

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July 6, 1943 Day two. The first counterattacks. However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (V. Kempf) - on July 5 did not fulfill the task of the day, faced with stubborn resistance from the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army that had advanced forward. As a result, Hausser was forced from 6 to 8 July to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely MD "Dead Head", to cover his right flank against the 375th Northern Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units brilliantly proved themselves in battles 5 July. On July 6, the tasks of the day for units of the 2nd Panzer SS (334 tanks) were determined: for the "Dead Head" MD (Brigadenführer G. Priss, 114 tanks) - the defeat of the 375th northern division and the expansion of the breakthrough corridor in the direction of the river. Linden Donets, for MD "Leibstandart" (Brigadenfuehrer T. Visch, 99 tanks, 23 self-propelled guns) and "Das Reich" (Brigadefuehrer V. Kruger, 121 tanks, 21 self-propelled guns) - the earliest breakthrough of the second line of defense near the village of Yakovlevo and access to the line bend of the Psel region - the village of Teterevino. At about 9:00 on July 6, 1943, after a powerful artillery preparation (carried out by artillery regiments of the Leibstandarte, Das Reich divisions and the 55th motorized rifle unit of six-barreled mortars), with the direct support of the 8th air corps (about 150 aircraft in the offensive zone), the 2nd SS Panzer Corps divisions crossed over to on the offensive, inflicting the main blow in the area occupied by 154 and 156 guards special forces. At the same time, the Germans managed to identify and carry out a fire raid on the command and control points of the regiments of the 51st Guards Special Division, which led to the disorganization of communications and command and control of its troops. In fact, the battalions of the 51st Guards Special Division repulsed enemy attacks without communication with the higher command, since the work of liaison officers was not effective due to the high dynamics of the battle. The initial success of the attack of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions was ensured due to the numerical advantage in the breakthrough sector (two German divisions against two Guards rifle regiments), as well as due to good interaction between divisional regiments, artillery and aviation - the forward divisions of the divisions, the main the ramming force of which were 13 and 8 heavy companies of "Tigers" (7 and 11 Pz.VI, respectively), with the support of assault gun divisions (23 and 21 StuG) advanced to the Soviet positions even before the end of the artillery and air strike, finding themselves at the moment of its end a few hundred meters from the trenches.

Slide No. 22

Slide Description:

July 6, 1943 Day two. The first counterattacks. By 13:00, battalions at the junction of 154 and 156 guards special forces were shot down from their positions and began an indiscriminate retreat in the direction of the villages of Yakovlevo and Luchki; The left-flank 158 of the Guards Special Forces, bending its right flank, as a whole, continued to hold the line of defense. The withdrawal of subunits 154 and 156 was carried out interspersed with enemy tanks and motorized infantry and was associated with heavy losses. The general leadership of the withdrawing battalions was practically absent, the actions of these units were determined only by the initiative of the junior commanders, not all of whom were ready for this. Some units of the 154 and 156 guards special forces went to the locations of neighboring divisions. The situation was partly saved by the actions of the 51st Guards artillery and the 5th Guards that was coming from the reserve. Of the Stalingrad Tank Corps - howitzer batteries of the 122nd Guards Army (Major M.N. divisions, knocking down the pace of the offensive of the battle groups MD "Leibstandart" and "Das Reich", in order to enable the retreating infantry to gain a foothold on new lines. At the same time, the gunners managed to retain most of their heavy weapons. A short but fierce battle broke out for the village of Luchki, in the area of ​​which the 464th Guards Artillery Division and the 460th Guards Mortar Battalion of the 6th Guards Rifle Brigade of the 5th Guards Rifle Brigade managed to deploy 15 km from the battle site).

Slide No. 23

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July 6, 1943 Day two. The first counterattacks. At 14:20 the armored group of the Das Reich division as a whole captured the village of Luchki, and the artillery units of the 6th anti-tank began to retreat north to the Kalinin farm. After that, right up to the third (rear) defensive line of the Voronezh Front in front of the Das Reich combat group, there were virtually no units of the 6th Guards Army that could hold back its offensive: the main forces of the anti-tank artillery of the army were located to the west - on the Oboyansk highway and in the offensive zone 48 tank, which, according to the results of the battles on July 5, was assessed by the army command as the direction of the main attack of the Germans (which was not entirely correct - the attacks of both German tank corps were considered by the German command to be equivalent). To repel the attack of the MD "Das Reich", the 6th Guards simply had no artillery left. The offensive of MD "Leibstandart" in the Oboyansk direction in the first half of the day on July 6 developed less successfully than that of "Das Reich", which was due to the greater saturation of Soviet artillery in its offensive sector, timely strikes of the 1st armored division (Colonel V. M. Gorelov) and 49 armored (Lieutenant Colonel A.F. Burda) from the 3 mechanized corps of the 1st tank army M.E. her tank regiment. Thus, by 14:00 on July 6, the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Division basically completed the first part of the general plan of the offensive - the left flank of the 6th Guards Division was crushed, and a little later, with the capture of the village of Yakovlevo from the 2nd SS Panzer Division, conditions were prepared for their replacement by units 48 tank. The advanced units of the 2nd Panzer SS were ready to begin fulfilling one of the general objectives of Operation Citadel - the destruction of the Red Army reserves in the area of ​​st. Prokhorovka. However, on July 6, Herman Gotu (commander of the 4th TA) did not succeed in fully fulfilling the offensive plan, due to the slow advance of the troops of the 48th tank, which collided with the skillful defense of the Katukov army that entered the battle in the afternoon. Although the Knobelsdorf corps managed to encircle some of the regiments of the 67th and 52nd Guards Special Division of the 6th Guards in the second half of the day. And in the interfluve of the Vorskla and Vorsklitsa rivers, however, having stumbled upon the tough defenses of the 3 micron brigades on the second line of defense, the corps divisions were unable to capture bridgeheads on the northern bank of the Pena River, discard the Soviet mechanized corps and reach the village. Yakovlevo for the subsequent change of parts of 2 TC SS. Moreover, on the left flank of the corps, the battle group of the tank regiment 3 md (F. Westhoven), which gaped at the entrance to the village of Zavidovka, was shot by tankmen and artillerymen of the 22nd division (Colonel N.G. Venenichev), which was part of the 6th tank regiment (Major General A D. Getman) 1 TA.

Slide No. 24

Slide Description:

July 6, 1943 Day two. The first counterattacks. Thus, during July 6, the formations of the 4th Tank Army managed to break through the second defense line of the Voronezh Front on their right flank, inflicting significant losses on the troops of the 6th Guards. And (of the six rifle divisions by the morning of July 7, only three remained combat-ready, of the two tank corps transferred to it - one). As a result of the loss of control over the units of the 51st Guards Special Division and 5th Guards Rifle Division, at the junction of the 1st TA and 5th Guards Rifle Division, a section not occupied by Soviet troops was formed, which in the following days, at the cost of incredible efforts, Katukov had to plug up brigades of the 1st Tank Army, using his experience of defensive battles under Eagle in 1941. However, all the successes of the 2nd SS, which led to the breakthrough of the second defensive line, again could not be embodied in a powerful breakthrough into the depths of the Soviet defense to destroy the strategic reserves of the Red Army, since the AG Kempf troops, having achieved some success on July 6, nevertheless could not again complete the task of the day. AG "Kempf" still could not provide the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army, which was threatened by the 2nd Guards. The losses of the Germans in armored vehicles also had a significant impact on the further course of events. So, for example, in the tank regiment md "Great Germany" 48 mk, after the first two days of the offensive, 53% of the tanks were considered unfit for combat (Soviet troops disabled 59 of 112 vehicles, including 12 Tigers out of 14 available), and 10 tbr to on the evening of July 6, only 40 combat "Panthers" (out of 192) were considered combat-ready. Therefore, on July 7, the 4 TA corps were assigned less ambitious tasks than on July 6 - the expansion of the breakthrough corridor and the provision of the army's flanks. Starting from July 6, 1943, not only the German command (which did it on July 5) had to retreat from the previously developed plans, but also the Soviet command, which clearly underestimated the strength of the German armored strike. In connection with the loss of combat effectiveness and the failure of the material part of most of the divisions of the 6th Guards. And, from the evening of July 6, the general operational control of the troops holding the second and third lines of the Soviet defense in the breakthrough area of ​​the German 4th Tank Army was actually transferred from the commander of the 6th Guards. And I. M. Chistyakov to the commander of the 1st Tank Army M. E. Katukov. The main frame of the Soviet defense in the following days was created around the brigades and corps of the 1st tank army.

Slide No. 25

Slide Description:

The Battle of Prokhorovka On July 12, one of the largest oncoming tank battles in history took place near the Prokhorovka station. On the German side, according to V. Zamulin, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps participated in it, which had 494 tanks and self-propelled guns, including 15 Tigers and not a single Panther. According to Soviet sources, about 700 tanks and assault guns took part in the battle from the German side. From the Soviet side, the 5th Panzer Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, took part in the battle. After inflicting a massive air strike, the battle on both sides passed into its active phase and continued until the end of the day. Here is one of the episodes that clearly shows what happened on July 12. The battle for the farm. "Oktyabrsky" and the height of 252.2 resembled the surf. Four tank brigades, three batteries, two rifle regiments and one battalion of a motorized rifle brigade rolled in waves against the defenses of the SS grenadier regiment, but, faced with fierce resistance, they retreated. This went on for almost five hours, until the guardsmen drove the grenadiers out of the area, suffering colossal losses.

Slide No. 26

Slide Description:

The Battle of Prokhorovka During the battle, a lot of tank commanders (platoon and company commanders) were out of action. High level of command personnel losses in the 32nd brigade: 41 tank commanders (36% of the total), tank platoon commander (61%), company (100%) and battalion (50%). The command echelon and the motorized rifle regiment of the brigade suffered very high losses; many company and platoon commanders were killed and seriously wounded. Its commander, Captain I. I. Rudenko, was out of action (they were evacuated from the battlefield to a hospital). A participant in the battle, deputy chief of staff of the 31st brigade, later Hero of the Soviet Union, Grigory Penezhko, recalled the state of a person in those terrible conditions.

Slide No. 27

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Losses According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, over 3500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield in the battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers are being questioned. For example, according to the calculations of G.A. Oleinikov, more than 300 German tanks could not take part in the battle. According to A. Tomzov's research, citing data from the German Federal Military Archives, during the battles on July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irrevocably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs. , in the short-term - 15 Pz.IV tanks and 1 Pz.III. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd Panzer SS for 12 July amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the "Dead Head" division. At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th Panzer Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks. According to the memoirs of FV von Mellenthin, Major General of the German fascist army, only the Reich and Leibstandart divisions, reinforced by a battalion of self-propelled guns, took part in the attack on Prokhorovka and, accordingly, the morning battle with the Soviet TA, reinforced by a battalion of "self-propelled guns" - up to 240 vehicles , incl. four "tigers". It was not intended to meet a serious enemy, according to the German command of the TA Rotmistrova, it was dragged into battle against the "Dead's Head" division (in fact, one corps) and the oncoming attack of more than 800 (according to their estimates) tanks was a complete surprise. However, there is reason to believe that the Soviet command "slept through" the enemy and the attack of the Tank Army with other corps was not at all an attempt to stop the Germans, but pursued the goal of going into the rear of the SS Panzer Corps, for which his "Dead Head" division was taken. The Germans were the first to notice the enemy and managed to rebuild for battle, the Soviet tankers had to do this already under fire.